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We use loan-level data to study how the organizational structure of banks impacts
small business lending. We ￿nd that decentralized banks ￿ where branch managers have
greater autonomy over lending decisions ￿ give larger loans to small ￿rms and those
with ￿soft information￿ . However, decentralized banks are also more responsive to their
own competitive environment. They are more likely to expand credit when faced with
competition but also cherry pick customers and restrict credit when they have market
power. This ￿darker side￿to decentralized banks in concentrated markets highlights that
the level of local banking competition is key to determining which organizational structure
provides better lending terms for small businesses.
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11 Introduction
Small banks are believed to play a critical role in ￿nancing young and small businesses in the
economy. In addition to their ability to engage in relationship banking (Petersen and Rajan,
1994; Berger and Udell, 1995), their decentralized lending structure gives them an important
advantage when lending to small ￿rms. The decentralized structure implies that branch managers
in small banks have far greater autonomy over adjudication and lending decisions, giving them an
incentive to collect and use ￿soft information￿when setting loan terms (Stein, 2002). Since much
of the information used in lending to small businesses may be "soft", this gives decentralized
banks an advantage in small-business lending relative to the centralized decision making structure
in large banks.
These di⁄erences in the organizational structure of banks can have important consequences
for the real economy. For example, Sapienza (2002) shows that small ￿rms are less likely to
borrow from banks subsequent to mergers (that tend to make them more hierarchical) relative
to ￿rms borrowing from banks that have not merged. Berger et al (2005) show that small
businesses located in US MSAs with a majority of large banks were more likely to face credit
constraints than ￿rms located close to small, decentralized banks. Likewise, Mian (2008) shows
that decentralized banks consistently engage in more lending activity to small ￿rms in markets
with weak contract enforceability. The predominant view that emerges from this literature
is that decentralized banks are the better answer for credit-constrained small ￿rms that may
otherwise be excluded from bank ￿nance.
Using a loan-level dataset on SME lending in Mexico, we ￿nd that this positive picture of
decentralized banks does not always hold true. While our results are consistent with prior work
in this literature, we show that the same discretion that allows branch managers of decentralized
banks to act on soft information also allows them to be more responsive to their own competitive
environment when setting loan terms. This can be bene￿cial for small businesses in competitive
banking markets where decentralized banks can help alleviate credit constraints. But, in line
with Rajan (1992), it also implies that decentralized banks might better-exploit their market
power in concentrated banking markets by restricting credit or charging higher interest rates to
small businesses.
Our empirical analyses are based on a comprehensive, loan-level panel dataset on small and
medium enterprise (SME) loans in Mexico, covering the period 2002 to 2006. We ￿nd that small
￿rms and those that tend to rely more on ￿ soft information￿get larger loans from decentralized
banks. These results are even stronger when using instrumental variables, indicating that the
di⁄erences across banks lie not just in the terms of lending, but also in the types of ￿rms that get
2approved for a loan. In concentrated banking markets, however, decentralized banks are more
likely than centralized banks to cherry pick the best ￿rms, give them smaller loans and charge
higher rates of interest. This is particularly true for ￿rms in the services sector, that provide less
￿hard information￿to banks, have less collateral, and hence tend to have fewer outside options
for external ￿nance.
Our results con￿rm the ￿ndings that decentralized banks are more likely to use soft informa-
tion when setting loan terms. However, we show that this can have both positive and negative
consequences for small ￿rms. While some of our results complement prior ￿ndings by showing
the bene￿ts of decentralized banks, the results also highlight that there may be a darker side
to decentralized bank lending. Put di⁄erently, the relative bene￿t of decentralized bank struc-
tures for small business lending may depend on the institutional and competitive environment
in which banks are located.
A novel feature of our analysis is that it allows us to get direct measures of organizational
structure without relying on the size of the banks. Since our results are based on banks that
have large, national presences but di⁄er in their organizational structure, we can also show that
it is in fact the organizational structure of banks that drives the observed patterns in our data
as opposed to some other factor that may be correlated with bank size (e.g. Brickley et al 2003).
In this way, the paper ties together two literatures that focus on small business lending but
have so far remained largely separate.1 On the one hand, it is related to studies examining how
competition in the banking industry impacts credit constraints of small, constrained startups
(Petersen and Rajan 1995; Black and Strahan 2002; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006; Kerr and
Nanda, 2009). On the other, it is related to studies examining how bank structure a⁄ects
lending outcomes (Stein 2002; Berger et al 2005). In tying together these two literatures, our
￿ndings may also explain why entrepreneurship increased signi￿cantly following the cross state
US banking deregulations from the late 1970s through the early 1990s, despite the fact that the
deregulations led to a wave of M&A activity where the number small banks fell dramatically. The
increase in entry following the deregulation is seen as a puzzle by some, as a fall in small banks
should have been associated with a decline in entrepreneurship. Our result highlights that the
increase in entrepreneurship in this instance may have occurred precisely because small banks
had been e⁄ective in exploiting their monopoly power in the period before the deregulation.
In this context, the competition between large banks ￿a second best outcome in itself￿was
nonetheless a better outcome for entrepreneurs than borrowing from monopolist small banks.
1Although not the focus of the paper, Sapienza￿ s (2002) analysis also speaks to the interaction between bank
size and market structure. Presbitero and Zazzaro (2010) examine the interaction between bank size and market
structure, but their focus is on banks￿ability to engage in relationship lending rather than their ability to use
soft information to their advantage.
3The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section I, we outline the theoretical consider-
ations for the paper. In Section 2, we outline our estimation design and the series of institutional
features we exploit in our analysis. Section 3 provides an overview of the Data and the descrip-
tive statistics. Section 4 outlines our regression results. Finally, in Section 5 we have a brief
discussion of our results, and conclusions.
2 Theoretical Considerations
Bank credit is the most important source of external ￿nance for young ￿rms and small and
medium enterprises (Berger and Udell, 1998; Robb and Robinson, 2009) and is often a key
source of capital helping SMEs to substitute for expensive trade credit (Fisman and Love, 2003;
Petersen and Rajan, 1997) . Given that these ventures are associated with high degrees of
asymmetric information, otherwise viable small businesses may still face credit constraints that
prevent them from growing or force them to prematurely shut down. Since the vast majority
of ￿rms in the economy are small2, ￿nancing constraints for small businesses are an important
academic and policy concern.
A large literature on bank lending to small ￿rms has therefore focused on how the organiza-
tional structure or the competitive environment of banks may a⁄ect small ￿rms￿access to credit
(Rajan 1992; Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1996; 2002; Black and Strahan,
2000). While much of the literature on bank structure has focused on the ability for smaller
banks to maintain lending relationships with small businesses, more recent papers have argued
that in addition, small banks may be better at alleviating credit constraints for small businesses
because they are more e⁄ective at processing the "soft information" of young and small ￿rms
(Stein, 2002).
According to this view, a key distinguishing factor of small business lending is that it relies
heavily on information that cannot be easily veri￿ed by others. For that reason, branch managers
of decentralized banks, who have more autonomy over lending decisions, will invest more energy
ex ante in processing the ￿ soft information￿available for small ￿rms. Given that these managers
bear full responsibility over lending choices, they have higher powered incentives to gather ￿ and
react to￿soft information from their clients. Branch managers in centralized banks, in contrast,
rely more heavily on ￿ hard information￿ such as credit scoring models. As a result, banks
with decentralized lending structures will have a comparative advantage in lending to young
2For example, of the 6 million ￿rms in the US with at least one employee, 5.3 million (89%) have less than 20
employees (US Small Business Administration, 1996)
4and small businesses with predominantly unveri￿able information, even when larger banks can
recreate some of the bene￿ts of lending relationships that small banks have.
In this paper, we build on the same intuition, but also examine the interaction between
bank structure and the competitive environment in which the banks are located. In particular,
we build on Rajan (1992) to hypothesize that branch managers in decentralized banks should
also be more responsive to their own competitive environment when setting deal terms, as they
are more ￿informed￿than managers of decentralized banks. In some instances, this may be
bene￿cial to small businesses because branch managers can set terms based on a more complete
set of information that better determines the actual borrower￿ s propensity to pay back a loan.
However, in other instances ￿ such as when banks have market power￿decentralized banks may
be able to extract more of the surplus from small ￿rms than centralized banks, by charging
higher rates or restricting access to credit.
3 Estimation Design
Empirically testing the hypothesis that banks with di⁄erent organizational structures have dif-
ferent lending terms ￿that also vary by the institutional environment ￿poses several challenges.
First, we need a measure of bank organizational structure that allows us to distinguish between
banks that use a centralized vs. a decentralized lending model. Second, we need to account for
the fact that the observed lending terms are endogenous, since they are conditional on selection
of ￿rms by banks. Decentralized banks may lend to di⁄erent types of ￿rms than centralized
banks. Therefore, comparing lending terms across the bank types without accounting for this
selection could lead to biased results. In addition, we need to account for the fact that the
distribution of bank branches for centralized and decentralized banks may vary systematically
across competitive environments in relation to the SME lending opportunity. Put di⁄erently,
centralized and decentralized banks may place a di⁄erent weight on the SME market when rolling
out new branches. Comparing lending terms for banks across di⁄erent environments may again
con￿ ate this selection of markets with the lending terms conditional on entering those markets.
In order to get an accurate measure of the banks￿organizational structure, one of the authors
conducted extensive interviews in each of the major banks in Mexico, at both the corporate and
the branch-level, to gain an insight into the degree of autonomy that branch managers had over
adjudication and lending process. In particular, during interviews with branch managers and
especially with the SME credit managers for each bank, we asked them to describe the loan
approval process. Based on those interviews, we created an index that re￿ ects the extent to
which lending decisions are taken at the bank￿ s central o¢ ces or at the branch level. We include
5capital budgeting, loan adjudication, client acquisition, loan amount, loan size, interest rate, and
collection decisions. Table 1 shows that the index varies from a minimum of 7 for HSBC (the
most centralized) to a maximum of 20 for Bajio (the most decentralized). It also shows that
there is a clear split between Santander and Banorte, which allows us to use a dummy variable
to group the two sets of banks into distinct categories for our analysis, where those banks with
a score of 10 or below are coded as being centralized.
We rely on important historical features of the Mexican banking industry to address the issues
of selection outlined above. As we outline in greater detail below, a series of factors impacting
the Mexican banking market e⁄ectively wiped out SME lending across all the major banks over
the decade prior to our study. In 2002, there was a renewed push from the government to initiate
lending to SMEs in Mexico, which led to the re-emergence of a small business lending market
subsequent to that period. We argue that the complete lack of SME lending in the decade prior
to our study implies that the distribution of centralized and decentralized bank branches across
markets was not driven by selection into better or worse SME markets but by other factors such
as the need to collect deposits. Moreover, the attractiveness of the SME market was equally
absent as a decision factor for all banks. Given this fact, we use the pre-existing distribution
of bank branches in 2002 as plausibly exogenous and hence also use the share of decentralized
banks in the ￿rm￿ s local banking market to instrument for the selection between bank types and
￿rms. This identi￿cation strategy has been used in other work looking at SME lending (Berger
et al 2005), as well in the extensive healthcare literature on competition and patient choice (e.g.
Kessler and McClennan 2000).
Since our identi￿cation strategy relies critically on showing that banks did not select into
markets, we provide a historical account of the Mexican banking sector in the section below.
3.1 The Mexican Banking Sector and SME Lending: 1990-2002
The Mexican banking industry has had a tumultuous history marked by a consistent restriction of
credit. From its origins, Mexican banks have been at the center of the Mexican political system,
and have monopolized the country￿ s ￿nancial resources. Their relative lack of competitiveness
only worsened when severe macroeconomic mismanagement led L￿pez Portillo￿ s government to
expropriate all private banks in 1981 (Haber 2004).3
Accordingly, when the government decided to privatize banks as part of its broader privati-
zation strategy in 1991, there still remained a fear of expropriation among investors. Given the
3This was in fact the third time that banks were expropriated since 1915. The two previous times, however,
occurred during the highly turbulent times that followed the Mexican Revolution and preceded the creation of
the national economic and political pact that gave rise to Mexican corporatism and the PRI￿ s hegemony
6government￿ s desperate need for resources due to aggressive expansionary policies, it sought to
auction the existing banks at the highest possible price. To attract investors, the government
granted them a protected oligopoly shielded from internal and external competition (Haber 2004)
and sold the banks to the highest bidder irrespective of managerial experience (Unal and Navarro
1999). As a result, Mexican banks sold with a premium of 45 percent over the value of their eq-
uity (Unal and Navarro 1999). An impenetrable oligopoly ran by less experienced managers was
created, which due to moral hazard, pervasive tunneling, and mis-reporting of non-performing
loans was highly volatile (Haber 2004).4 The natural end result was the collapse of the banking
sector in 1994 that continued the protracted years of restricted lending and Mexico￿ s distinction
as a poor ￿nancing environment.
Aside from the resultant crisis, the institutional setup had other practical implications. Be-
tween the nationalization of 1981, the privatization of 1991, and the years leading up to the 1994
crisis, most banks lost their credit analysis capabilities and the incentive to engage in commercial
lending. As the banks were ￿rst expropriated and later re-privatized, their administration was
increasingly centralized. What little discretion was still available to branch managers was lost
when the 1994 crisis led to a complete restriction of lending, an expensive governmental bailout
of all banks, and a desperate need for capitalization of the system. Mexican banks were opened
to foreign investment in 1997 and foreign ownership increased from 16 percent in 1997 to 83
percent by 2004 (Haber and Musacchio 2005). The market was also further concentrated, where
the ￿ve largest banks gained control of around 70 percent of the market. While the capital in-
jection increased the centralization of practices, it did not increase lending; in fact, the opposite
occurred (Haber 2004; Haber and Musacchio 2005).
At the same time, the privatization of the early 1990s led to the emergence of new regional
banks which, given that they were in their emergence stage during the crisis, did not su⁄er
from the mismanagement associated with the bidding wars of the larger ￿nancial groups. Banks
such as Banco Mercantil del Norte ￿ which later became Banorte￿ and Banco del Baj￿o emerged
as new, private, regional operations during the privatization era. As other banks collapsed
during 1995 and were sold to foreign owners, these regional operations found themselves as the
sole providers of credit to the government and grew vertiginously throughout the country to
national or quasi-national operations. This also shielded them from the aggressive entrance of
international capital during the 1997 wave, and they thus retained the decentralized structures
that they grew with.
The period from 1997 to 2000 was one of greater stability, where both centralized and de-
4Most of these managers did not have previous banking experience. Rather, they emerged out of trading
companies and investment banks that developed during the stock exchange boom.
7centralized banks were able to maintain high levels of pro￿tability without engaging in much
commercial lending ￿by lending to the government, their own shareholders, and by charging
extremely high fees and commissions to account holders (Haber and Musacchio 2005). That
commercial lending was not a priority for banks is re￿ ected in the continued downward trend in
the activity, with private sector lending as a percentage of GDP falling from 14.5% in 1997 to
9.2% in 2001 ￿ the lowest levels of all OECD countries.
The retraction of credit a⁄ected Mexican SMEs disproportionately. Up to 1985, development
banks in Mexico such as NAFINSA and Banrural played a central role in business ￿nancing
through several government-sponsored funds. While their aim was to complement the role of
commercial banks, in most cases they actually substituted all SME ￿nancing. Due to several
structural and contextual factors (including the repeated ￿nancial and macroeconomic crises)
these agencies lowered their activity considerably during the decades of the 80s and 90s (Canales,
2008). During the privatization of the early 1990s, some credit did reach SMEs, but given
the organizational factors described above, loans were mostly given with aggressive property
collateral requirements and were often denominated in dollars (Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al, 1997).
As a result, the credit crunch combined with the currency crisis a⁄ected SMEs ￿ especially those
in nontradable sectors￿ disproportionately, further decreasing their already scant access to credit.
Mexican businesses thus perfected the art of survival without ￿nancing. Around seventy percent
of Mexican businesses ￿nance their operations through trade and supplier credit, which carries
costs of 60 to 150 percent per year (Banco de Mexico 2010, 2011). An extra 15 percent of
business ￿nancing comes from alternative credit sources (sometimes coded in surveys as SME
loans) such as personal credit cards or personal mortgage loans, which are equally ine¢ cient
(Banco de Mexico 2010, 2011).
In sum, SME credit has historically not been a priority for any bank in Mexico. Rather,
banks have based their pro￿tability on extremely high commissions for retail banking and on
government lending. Accordingly, branching decisions have been based on opportunities for
retail banking. Mexican banks basically entered the new millennium with little lending to the
commercial sector, but with two di⁄erent ￿and equally successful￿organizational structures for
retail banking: fully centralized and decentralized. Banks ported their retail lending technologies
to the SME sector. This fact therefore allows us to use the bank structure and the distribution
of bank branches as exogenous to the SME lending opportunity. We describe tests of this claim
in the section below.
84 Data
The data for this study is drawn from a proprietary loan-level database maintained by the
ministry of the economy of Mexico. In 2002, there was a renewed push from the government to
initiate lending to SMEs in Mexico. The Ministry of the Economy was reformed to include a
sub-ministry for the development of SMEs, which determined SME access to bank credit as one
of the main priorities of the ministry. The initiatives to bring credit to SMEs were grouped under
the National SME Financing System (SINAFIN, for its initials in Spanish). While the program
evolved and changed considerably from its inception in 2001 and its initial implementation in
2002, its initial incarnation consisted of a government-funded guarantee system that covered
banks￿SME loan losses. The program included both a ￿rst-losses product that covered a set
percentage of a bank￿ s SME loan portfolio, and a traditional guarantee that covered up to 75
percent of each loan that defaulted, but that had a cost of around two percent of the guaranteed
amount.
The SINAFIN program provided an incentive for the banks to experiment with a segment that
they had traditionally overlooked while they focused on less risky but still pro￿table investments.
As the banks developed pilot products for SMEs and started testing the segment, they discovered
that there was a much larger demand for loans, at much better repayment rates, than they
had anticipated. During its ￿rst ￿ve years of operation, and even though it is a relatively
small program (US$150 million were invested between 2001 and 2006) it generated very positive
results.
Over the period that we study, all SME loans given by private-sector banks through the
program are included in this database. It is important to note that, given that this was the
￿rst e⁄ort by the banks at creating a SME-speci￿c product, in fact the database is a good
approximation on all loans granted to SMEs in the period.5 The database includes unique ￿rm-
and bank- identi￿ers, basic ￿rm-level information such as the ￿rm size, industry, and location
as well as a set of loan-level characteristics such as the purpose of the loan (working capital
vs. ￿xed asset investment), the amount of the loan and the interest rate that was charged. A
separate database also maintains whether a ￿rm defaulted on its loan.
We use the information on ￿rm size to bucket ￿rms into one of three categories ￿ ￿rms
with less than 15 employees are classi￿ed as "Micro", those with more than 15 but less than
5Starting in 2007, the rules around the guarantee program and SME lending operations of some banks changed,
so that not all loans for each bank were included in the data. However, interviews with both the ministry of the
economy and o¢ cials at each of the major banks have con￿rmed that over the period we study, the database is
comprehensive for all SME-speci￿c credit products. Other loans were surely granted to SMEs, but they would
have taken the form of mortgage loans or personal consumer loans received by the entrepreneurs and funneled to
their business.These personal loans are often coded as SME loans in survey data.
930 employees are classi￿ed as "Small", and those with more than 30 employees are classi￿ed
as "Medium".6 Table 2A provides descriptive statistics on the ￿rms in our sample. As can
be seen from Table 2A, 60% of the ￿rms in this sample are Micro ￿rms, with an average size
of 6 employees. A further 22% are Small ￿rms with an average size of 21 employees and the
remaining 18% are classi￿ed as Medium ￿rms with an average size of 52 employees. Table 2A
also highlights di⁄erences in the share of loans each type of ￿rm takes for ￿xed asset loans,
compared to working capital; and di⁄erences in the interest rate charged across di⁄erent types
of ￿rms.
In table 2 B, we provide descriptive statistics by banks￿lending structure. The descriptive
evidence in table 2 B is consistent with the hypothesis that decentralized banks are better at
processing "soft information". Although 18% of all the loans in the database are given by
decentralized banks, they account for 48% of the loans given to ￿rms in the service sector ￿
which tends to be associated much more with soft information than ￿rms that are engaged in
either manufacturing or in retail and wholesale trade (commerce). Moreover, while less than
half a percent of centralized banks￿loans are given for ￿xed asset investments, nearly a quarter
of decentralized banks￿loans are used for this purpose. While it may seem that ￿xed asset loans
may involve less soft information as part of the approval decision, they often tend to be more
risky in this context because the liquidation value of collateral that SMEs can post is usually of
little value to the banks.7 Further, as can be seen from Table 2 A, the vast majority of these
loans are given to Micro ￿rms which tend to be less established, less structured, and have less
solid ￿nancial information.
5 Regression Results
5.1 Bank Lending Structure and Deal Terms
In Table 3, we report estimates from loan-level regressions where the dependent variable is the
size of loans to small businesses. The estimations take the form:
6As de￿ned by the Ministry of the Economy. Not all ￿rms in the database have an estimate of the number
of employees, but branch managers were required to provide an estimate of the ￿rm size when giving the loan.
Our categorization maps onto this logic, and hence we use the branch managers￿estimate of the category for the
￿rm in instances where we do not have the data to calculate it ourselves.
7This is especially true for small manufacturing ￿rms. There is very little a bank can do, for example, with a
specialized plastic injection machine.
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In these regressions, ￿s;￿t; i refer to state, year, and industry ￿xed e⁄ects. State ￿xed
e⁄ects capture systematic di⁄erences in the lending environment across states (such as bank-
ruptcy laws) that may a⁄ect loan sizes. Similarly year ￿xed e⁄ects and industry ￿xed e⁄ects
(controlling for manufacturing, commerce and retail ￿rms) control for systematic di⁄erences
in loan characteristics across these industry types, or across years. DECENTRALIZED is
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the ￿rm is categorized as a decentralized bank.8
SMALL and MICRO refer to dummy variables indicating the type of ￿rm receiving the loan,
and DEC ￿SMALL and DEC ￿MICRO refer to the interaction between the dummy variable
for decentralized banks with the dummy variables of ￿rm type. In some speci￿cations we also
add bank ￿xed e⁄ects, to control for ￿xed di⁄erences in the lending policies and practices across
banks. In these speci￿cations that include bank ￿xed e⁄ects, the main e⁄ect of decentralized
banks is absorbed by the bank ￿xed e⁄ects and hence is not reported. The matrix X refers to
other characteristics of the loan, such as whether it was a ￿xed asset or working capital loan as
well as the HHI index of bank concentration associated with the municipality in the which the
￿rm is located.
Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 3 show that even after controlling for covariates, Decentralized
banks are associated with giving larger loans to SMEs. Column (iii) includes the interaction
with the decentralized bank dummy and shows that, consistent with the descriptive statistics,
decentralized banks give larger loans to small and micro ￿rms, although there is no meaningful
di⁄erence in the loan size for medium ￿rms. This highlights that the higher loan sizes to SME
￿rms reported in columns (i) and (ii) are driven by di⁄erences in loan sizes to the Small and Micro
￿rms. To account for the fact that these di⁄erences are not driven by compositional di⁄erences
or practices of speci￿c banks, we include bank ￿xed e⁄ects in column (iv). Given that the
loan sizes to medium ￿rms are comparable across bank types, the speci￿cation in column (iv)
is equivalent to a di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences speci￿cation, where we examine whether give larger
loans to small and micro ￿rms relative to the loans given to medium ￿rms. Our results continue
to be robust to bank ￿xed e⁄ects.
8We do run a robustness check where we replace our dummy variable of decentralized banks with a continuous
measure of decentralization outlined in Table 1. All our results are robust to this alternative measure of
decentralization.
11As noted above, however, these results could still simply re￿ ect that the di⁄erent lending
technologies of decentralized and centralized banks lead to systematic di⁄erences in the types of
small and micro ￿rms that are granted credit. We therefore interpret the results of Model (iv)
with caution, since they are likely to be biased by these selection e⁄ects.
To address potential selection biases we need to instrument for whether a ￿rm gets a loan
from a decentralized bank. As we outline in the section above, we use the share of decentralized
bank branches in the municipality where the ￿rm is located as an instrument for whether the
￿rm actually receives a loan from a decentralized bank. In other words, in a municipality where
decentralized banks have a very high proportion of the total bank branches, ￿rms are much more
likely to have been served by a decentralized bank, regardless of their characteristics. We argue
that this identi￿cation strategy is valid because as we discussed in Section 2, the branching
patterns across municipalities was driven by retail banking (deposits, checking accounts, credit
cards), and not SME lending. Moreover, since the lending structures across the two di⁄erent
types of banks were driven by factors unrelated to the emergence of the SINAFIN program, the
share of decentralized banks should proxy for the probability that a ￿rm was matched with a
decentralized bank, but should be unrelated to systematic di⁄erences in the quality of ￿rms and
the terms that a given ￿rm would expect to receive.9 Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 1 test these
assumptions empirically and ￿nd them to be valid. Table A1 compares the proportion of all
centralized and decentralized bank activity ￿ measured as bank branches￿ that is concentrated
in states that have a population of SME ￿rms above the median. Table A2 shows that the
proportion of decentralized to centralized bank branches in the total market, as well as within
more competitive or more concentrated markets, has remained constant through time. This is
true even though the total number of branches in these di⁄erent markets has changed. The
results indicate that both types of banks have followed similar branching strategies. All these
analyses show that there does not seem to be a signi￿cant and systematic di⁄erence in how
centralized and decentralized banks allocate their activity to particular states or local banking
markets, with respect to the SME lending opportunity. In addition, in Appendix 2, we show
that along a number of dimensions, the two sets of banks are no di⁄erent from each other in
terms of overall performance.
We report the results of these IV regressions in Column (v) of Table 3. Comparing column
(iv) and column (v) of Table 3 highlights that after controlling for the selection bias, decentralized
banks are seen to give even larger loans to Small and Micro ￿rms. The direction of the bias
suggests that decentralized banks are more likely to give loans to smaller ￿rms within a given
9We also verify empirically that the share of decentralized banks across the di⁄erent types of markets does
not vary in ways that are statistically sign￿cantly di⁄erent from variations in the share of centralized banks.
12size category, consistent with the view that decentralized banks are better are processing soft
information. In unreported regressions, we also ￿nd that this selection bias tends to be stronger
for small and micro ￿rms in the service sector (with more soft information) compared to ￿rms
engaged in manufacturing or commerce.
In Table 4, we turn to examining the interest rate that banks charge to the ￿rms. The
estimations take the form:
ln(RATE) = ￿s + ￿t +  i + ￿1X (2)
+￿2SMALL + ￿3MICRO + ￿4DECENTRALIZED
+￿5DEC ￿ SMALL + ￿6DEC ￿ MICRO + "s;t;b;i
In these regressions, ln(RATE) refers to the premium over the risk free rate controlling for
the duration of the loan, and the set of covariates and controls are the same as those used in
equation (1). The ￿rst three models in Table 4 suggest that ￿rms borrowing from decentralized
banks pay a higher interest rate. In model (iv), the OLS results show that decentralized banks
charge more to small and micro ￿rms, but not to medium ￿rms. These results are strengthen
when we include bank ￿xed e⁄ects in column (iv). It is possible, however, that the higher
interest rates may be driven by the smaller, ￿ riskier￿￿rms that decentralized banks might be
lending to (as noticed by results in Table 3). Comparing column (iv) and column (v) of Table
4 shows that this is indeed the case. What model (v) suggests is that once we control for the
selection bias in the types of ￿rms that decentralized banks lend to, there is no meaningful
di⁄erence in the interest rates that centralized and decentralized banks charge to small ￿rms,
while the coe¢ cient is slightly attenuated (but still statistically signi￿cant) for micro ￿rms.
Our results in this section map closely to prior ￿ndings (e.g. Berger et al, 2005) that de-
centralized banks are far more e⁄ective at processing soft information, and hence better-able to
alleviate ￿nancing constraints for small ￿rms. Previous research has typically relied on bank size
as a proxy for decentralized lending structures. Since we are comparing banks that have national
presence but have a direct measures of their organizational structure, we can con￿rm that it is
decentralization ￿ and not a di⁄erent mechanism correlated with bank size￿ that accounts for
our results.10 Interviews with credit brokers,11, branch managers, credit directors, and national
10In Appendix 3, we include a robustness check where we replace our measure of bank decentralization with
a proxy of bank size based on bank assets. Appendix 3 con￿rms the verbal reasoning that these results are
not driven purely by bank size, but suggest that it is decentralization that is the mechanism through which it
operates.
11Credit brokers ￿ or ￿extension agents￿ ￿ help ￿rms structure their loan applications and advise them through
13product managers of the di⁄erent banks also con￿rmed these ￿ndings. Interviewees consistently
referred to the comparative advantage for decentralized banks to provide more customized loans
or to evaluate ￿rms whose information was not as clear. In contrast, they suggested that cen-
tralized banks have an advantage in the standardization of their product and the speed with
which their credit scoring system can determine lending decisions.
5.2 Lending Terms by Bank Structure and the Institutional Envi-
ronment
We now turn to the ability of banks to respond to the local environment in which they are located.
Given the added discretion that branch managers of decentralized banks have, we might expect
them to be more responsive to the local institutional environment compared to branch managers
in centralized banks. In order to examine this further, we look at the competitive environment
in each municipality to see if the deal terms o⁄ered by decentralized banks are systematically
di⁄erent from those o⁄ered by centralized banks across di⁄erent environments. In order to do
so we, estimate the following speci￿cations:
ln(SIZE) = ￿s + ￿t +  i + +￿1HHI + ￿2SMALL + ￿3MICRO (3)
+￿4DECENTRALIZED + ￿5DEC ￿ HHI + "s;t;b;i
and
ln(RATE) = ￿s + ￿t +  i + +￿1HHI + ￿2SMALL + ￿3MICRO (4)
+￿4DECENTRALIZED + ￿5DEC ￿ HHI + "s;t;b;i
where HHI refers to the level of banking competition in the local market where the loan was
given. We measure bank competition using the log of the HHI concentration index calculated
using the share of each bank￿ s branches in a given municipality and year. The municipality-level
regressions provide a measure of the concentration in the "local" banking market in which the
￿rm is located and go beyond measures of concentration at the state-level (which may not be
a good proxy of the actual choices that ￿rms face in their local markets). We also include an
the application process. They are, in most cases, ￿nanced by the state and are paid a small commission for loan
applications submitted at banks and a larger commission for approved loans. They can take a prospective client
to any bank.
14interaction between decentralized banks and our measure of local banking competition, captured
by the variable DEC ￿ HHI: These results are reported in Table 5.
Column (i) of Table 5 shows that although decentralized banks give larger loans to SMEs, they
are likely to give smaller loans to ￿rms in more concentrated markets relative to centralized banks.
The coe¢ cient on column (i) of Table 5 suggests that an increase in banking concentration from
the median to the seventy ￿fth percentile will lead decentralized banks to give loans that are 60%
smaller than those given by centralized banks. The results are robust to the inclusion of bank
￿xed e⁄ects, and comparing the results from the IV regressions Column (iii) to Column (ii) again
shows the selection present in decentralized-bank lending across markets. Decentralized banks
give smaller loans in concentrated markets than centralized banks and moreover, the nature of
selection suggests that they are lending to larger, "safer ￿rms" in concentrated markets. This
hypothesis is corroborated by looking at the interest rates charged by banks. Although it seems
as if decentralized banks charge the same in concentrated markets, this is in fact driven by
selection. IV regressions show that they charge more in concentrated markets to an equivalent
￿rm, implying that the null result in the OLS regressions was driven by the fact that they lend
to safer ￿rms.
We provide further descriptive evidence of cherry picking in Tables 6 and 7. Since our
hypothesis is that decentralized bank managers are more reactive to the institutional environment
than those in centralized banks, we should ￿nd that measures of lending activity should be more
constant across markets in centralized banks than in decentralized banks. In Table 6, we show
the share of lending activity for the di⁄erent types of banks, broken down by ￿rm type and
market concentration. We segment markets by those that are the 25% most concentrated, the
25% most competitive and those in the middle 50% of concentration. Table 6 shows that for
centralized banks, the share of their loans across these market types track closely to the share
of branches and moreover, are very similar for medium, small and micro ￿rms. On the other
hand, decentralized ￿rms are more likely to be aggressive in lending in competitive markets, but
to restrict credit access in concentrated markets. This is most true of micro ￿rms (whereas for
medium ￿rms the pattern looks much more similar to the pattern in centralized banks). This
"di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences" descriptive evidence where medium ￿rms look similar but micro ￿rms
do not, suggests that this pattern for decentralized banks is not driven by a di⁄erent relative
share in branches for decentralized and centralized banks, but rather by the actual lending
decisions of branch managers. In Table 7, we break down our results of Table 5 by type of ￿rm.
Table 7 highlights that, similar to Table 6, our results for credit rationing are most pronounced
for the small and micro ￿rms and much less so for the medium ￿rms, where the OLS and IV
results are relatively similar.
155.3 Robustness Checks
One potential concern with our results is that decentralized banks are inherently ￿better￿at
all they do and, accordingly, our results only re￿ ect these systematic performance di⁄erences
rather than the di⁄erential ability to process soft information. Appendix 2 highlights that in a
bivariate analysis, decentralized banks seem no di⁄erent from centralized banks along measures
of ROE and e¢ ciency, and may fare slightly worse than centralized banks in terms of ROA. This
suggests that our results are not due to systematic di⁄erences in bank performance on all fronts.
A second concern with our results is that they may re￿ ect di⁄erential risk tolerance across
bank types. Again, in Appendix 2 we show that while mortgage default rates are similar across
banks, commercial default rates are lower for decentralized banks in aggregate, suggesting that
the observed patterns are not due to di⁄erential risk tolerance across bank types. However, we
examine this concern further by looking ￿rm-level defaults across the di⁄erent types of banks.
One limitation with our default data is that it has patchy information on the bank associated
with the default. That is, the database informs us whether a ￿rm defaulted on a loan, but for
￿rms holding several loans we do not know which particular loan they defaulted on. We therefore
restrict our sample to ￿rms that received a loan from only one bank. These constitute 92% of
the ￿rms in our sample. The results from these regressions are reported in Table 8.
In order to facilitate comparisons with the IV regressions, we ￿rst run linear probability
models where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ￿rm
defaulted on its loan. As can be seen from Table 8, small and micro ￿rms tend to have higher
default rates, highlighting the fact that they are more risky. However, the results also show
that there are no di⁄erences in the propensity for loans given by either type of bank to default.
These results suggest that the di⁄erences in the lending terms being observed across banks
are a function of their lending technologies rather than di⁄erences in overall risk tolerance or
actual risk. Moreover, they suggest that, holding ￿rm characteristics and risk preferences stable,
decentralized banks actually grant larger loans and manage to keep their default rates at the
same level in competitive markets. The fact that loan size is associated with higher default rates
also indicates why decentralized banks choose to restrict credit in un-competitive environments
in addition to cherry-picking their loans.
Finally, one possible explanation for this may be the distinction between "foreign" and "do-
mestic" banks as opposed to the lending structure per se. While we cannot rule out this
possibility since foreign banks tend to have centralized lending structures while most of the do-
mestic banks do not, we believe that our results point to a speci￿c mechanism related to the
organizational structure of foreign versus domestic banks (distinct from risk preferences) that
might explain the di⁄erential results related to bank lending that have been found in prior work
16looking at bank lending in emerging markets (Mian, 2006; Detragiache et al 2008).
6 Discussion and Conclusions
Young and small ￿rms are especially dependent on external ￿nance for their growth and survival.
The vast majority of their ￿nancing￿ especially in developed markets￿ tends to come from banks
(Berger and Udell, 1998; Robb and Robinson, 2009). Given the size of such businesses, credit
is often concentrated at a single intermediary where the borrower has a lending relationship
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Fluck et al, 1998; Sapienza 2002). Small businesses, and particularly
young small businesses, have little internal cash ￿ ow to ￿nance their operations and are also
associated with signi￿cant asymmetric information. Accordingly, a potential concern for policy
makers is that these businesses face credit constraints. This is certainly the case in Mexico,
where smaller ￿rms mostly have to rely on expensive trade credit or the owners￿personal credit
cards to ￿nance their operations (Fisman and Love, 2003).
A large body of academic research has therefore focused on how the structure of the bank-
ing industry ￿ both in terms of the competitive environment for banks and in terms of the
organizational structure of banks themselves ￿ is associated with product market outcomes for
small businesses. However, the two streams of study ￿ one focused on banking competition and
the other on bank structure ￿ have remained largely independent of each other, and in fact,
generated potentially contradictory ￿ndings. On the one hand, research on the organizational
structure of banks has focused on the bene￿ts of a decentralized banking structure in the context
of small business lending. On the other hand, research looking at small business lending suggests
that banking deregulation led to a widespread increase in entrepreneurial activity despite the
wave of mergers that led small, decentralized banks to fall signi￿cantly following the deregula-
tions (Black and Strahan 2000; Kerr and Nanda 2009). Viewed in the context of our ￿ndings,
however, these apparently contradictory ￿ndings make sense: while decentralized banks are
indeed better than centralized banks at alleviating credit constraints for small businesses in
competitive markets, they are in fact worse than centralized banks in concentrated banking
markets. Thus an increase in banking competition along-side an increase in the presence of
centralized banks due to M&A activity would still have had a positive impact on entrepreneur-
ship as a result of the reduction in monopoly power of small decentralized banks. Our ￿ndings
may also shed light on the mechanism behind the ￿ndings by Berger, Sauders, Scalise and Udell
(1998) that bank mergers in US tended to increase small business lending by competitors to the
merging banks as well as the ￿nding by Erel (2009) that the M&A activity following the US
branch banking deregulations led to a sharp fall in the interest rates for ￿rms, and particularly
for small businesses.
17Our approach in this paper brings together the literature related to the organizational struc-
ture of banks with the one looking at banking competition to look at how the interaction be-
tween these two factors impacts the deal terms o⁄ered to small businesses. Our results show
that branch managers in decentralized banks are more sensitive to the local environment than
branch managers in centralized banks. They give more attractive terms to ￿rms in competitive
banking markets, but are more likely to cherry pick ￿rms and restrict credit in areas where they
have market power. Thus the extent to which decentralized banks alleviate credit constraints
depends critically on the competitive environment for banks.
Our results build on the empirical work of Sapienza (2002) and Berger et al (2005) who
￿nd that the organizational structure of banks can have important consequences for the small
businesses that seek credit in a given market. While they proxy for the decentralized nature of
the lending technology using bank size, our in-depth qualitative interviews with the major banks
in Mexico allowed us to identify large banks with decentralized lending structures. Our results
therefore also speak to the hypothesis that Berger et al (2005) raise in their conclusion that "a
large organization might, at least to a degree, be able to enjoy the best of both worlds if it sets
up the internal structure that achieves the right level of decentralization." We are also able to
look at the rates of default for the di⁄erent types of banks, so that we can show more directly
that the di⁄erences in deal terms seem to be driven more by the lending technology of banks
rather than other factors such as their inherent risk preferences.
Our ￿ndings also implications for public policy. Prior work has identi￿ed the relative bene￿t
of decentralized (small) banks in alleviating credit constraints among small businesses ￿ in
the context of more competitive environments. It thus has argued that the key issue from a
public policy standpoint may not be market power in the traditional Her￿ndahl-index sense,
but more about the choice of banks that ￿rms have access to. Our results suggest that both
the organizational structure and the localized market power of a bank are relevant for SME
lending, and they should not be considered independently. This implication is also related to
other work looking a the importance of examining organizational structure within the context
of the institutional environment and not treating it in isolation (e.g. Raith 2003).
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kTotal Medium Small Micro
Fraction of loans in database 100% 18% 22% 60%
Average Number of Employees* 16 52 21 6
Average Loan Size (USD) 29,315 44,341 31,227 24,109
Premium over risk free rate 11.1% 9.8% 10.3% 11.2%
Fixed Asset Loan share 3.7% 1.1% 0.7% 5.6%
* Calculated on a subset (~ 70%) of firms for which data availble
Table 2 A
Descriptive Statistics are based on 83,930 loans over the period January 2002 to December 2006




Fraction of loans in database 100% 18% 82%
Fraction in Manufacturing 100% 10% 90%
Fraction in Commerce 100% 9% 91%
Fraction in Services 100% 48% 52%
Fixed Asset Loan Share 4.6% 19.0% 0.4%
Average Loan Size (USD)
All Firms 29,315 35,688 27,886
Medium Firms 44,341 41,124 44,927
Small Firms 31,227 38,600 29,832
Micro Firms 24,109 33,279 21,530
Median spread over risk free rate
All Firms 10.1% 12.7% 10.7%
Medium Firms 10.1% 9.9% 10.1%
Small Firms 10.3% 11.7% 10.3%
Micro Firms 11.2% 14.3% 11.1%
Table 2 B
Descriptive Statistics are based on 83,930 loans over the period January 2002 to December 2006
Banks' Lending StructuresIV
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Log Herfindahl index (at town level) -0.077 -0.082* -0.081* -0.068* -0.067*
(0.045) (0.038) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
Fixed Asset Loan -0.910*** -0.958*** -1.066*** -1.064*** -1.087***
(0.160) (0.187) (0.218) (0.236) (0.230)
Borrower has defaulted before 0.089 0.079 0.078 0.073 0.068
(0.096) (0.093) (0.092) (0.096) (0.096)
Micro Firm -0.777*** -0.768*** -0.885*** -0.924*** -0.977***
(0.184) (0.179) (0.146) (0.160) (0.153)
Small Firm -0.393 -0.392* -0.468** -0.473** -0.549**
(0.203) (0.201) (0.191) (0.191) (0.169)
Decentralized Bank 0.457*** 0.477*** -0.070
(0.069) (0.063) (0.170)
Decentralized Bank x Micro 0.713** 0.800*** 1.132**
(0.199) (0.198) (0.388)
Decentralized Bank x Small 0.467* 0.479* 1.066*
(0.204) (0.207) (0.469)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
F-Statistic 370.82
Observations 83,930 83,930 83,930 83,930 83,930
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.21
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by bank
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OLS
Table 3
The dependent Variable is log of loan amount.  All regressions include industry controls (Manufacturing, Commerce or Services) and year fixed 
effects. Models 2-5 include state fixed effects and Models 4-5 include bank fixed effects.  IV regressions include separate instruments for both 
endogenous variables as outlined in the text.  Note that bank fixed effects imply that the main effect of decentralized banks is not identified, and 
hence is not reported in the tables.  A firm is coded as "Micro" if the number of employees is under 15; "Small" if the number of employees is 
between 15 and 30.  The omitted category, "Medium", is a firm with over 30 employees.
Loan Size by Banks' Lending StructureIV
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Log Herfindahl index (at town level) 0.005 0.024** 0.025** 0.013 0.013
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Fixed Asset Loan 0.499** 0.493** 0.447** 0.086 0.082
(0.181) (0.176) (0.170) (0.059) (0.075)
Borrower has defaulted before 0.048* 0.041* 0.042* 0.016 0.017
(0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.034) (0.034)
Micro Firm 0.170* 0.164* 0.114 0.070 0.073
(0.086) (0.082) (0.071) (0.108) (0.100)
Small Firm 0.076* 0.075* 0.049** 0.033 0.049
(0.032) (0.031) (0.020) (0.021) (0.030)
Decentralized Bank 0.182*** 0.197*** -0.022
(0.046) (0.040) (0.087)
Decentralized Bank x Micro 0.297** 0.361** 0.334**
(0.100) (0.133) (0.123)
Decentralized Bank x Small 0.142 0.175* 0.036
(0.096) (0.097) (0.122)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
F-Statistic 370.82
Observations 83,930 83,930 83,930 83,930 83,930
R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.21
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by bank
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OLS Regressions
Table 4
The dependent Variable is log of loan's premium over the risk free rate.  All regressions include industry controls (Manufacturing, Commerce or 
Services) and year fixed effects. Models 2-5 include state fixed effects and Models 4-5 include bank fixed effects.    IV regressions include separate 
instruments for both endogenous variables as outlined in the text.  Note that bank fixed effects imply that the main effect of decentralized banks is not 
identified, and hence is not reported in the tables.  A firm is coded as "Micro" if the number of employees is under 15; "Small" if the number of 
employees is between 15 and 30.  The omitted category, "Medium", is a firm with over 30 employees.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































e(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Log Herfindahl index (at town level) 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.002
-0.002 (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
Fixed Asset Loan -0.014 -0.012 -0.025 -0.009
(0.011) (0.010) (0.027) (0.005)
Log amount 0.003* 0.003* 0.002 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Log rate -0.011 -0.01 -0.017 -0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.006)
Micro Firm 0.004** 0.005** (0.003) 0.006*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Small Firm 0.003 0.004* 0.004 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Decentralized Bank x Micro 0.008 0.043
(0.005) (0.046)
Decentralized Bank x Small 0.006 -0.024
(0.004) (0.059)
Decentralized Bank x Log Herfindahl Index 0.000 0.044
(0.002) (0.097)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Statistic 20.3
Observations 69,344 69,344 69,344 69,344
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the bank level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OLS Regressions IV Regressions
Loan Defaults by Bank Structure
The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the firm defaulted on the loan.  All regressions include industry controls (Manufacturing, 
Commerce or Services) and year fixed effects, state fixed effects and bank fixed effects. Note that bank fixed effects imply that the main effect 
of decentralized banks is not identified, and hence is not reported in the tables. The number of observations in these regressions are lower 
because the default database does not have consistent data on the bank associated with the default. We therefore restrict these regressions to 
those firms that only took a loan from a single bank.  This constitutes the vast majority of firms, although a few firms are seen to take multiple 
loans from different banks.   















TABLE A1: Share of branches in states with above median 
SME businesses per capita, by type of bank organization 
structure
TABLE A2: Ratio of the number of decentralized to centralized 





















(iii) (iv) (v) (iii) (iv) (v)
Log Herfindahl index (at town level) -0.079 -0.069* -0.064* 0.022** 0.013 0.015
(0.046) (0.036) (0.032) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Fixed Asset Loan -0.782** -0.956*** -1.240** 0.626** 0.150* 0.053
(0.216) (0.197) (0.365) (0.181) (0.065) (0.126)
Borrower has defaulted before 0.088 0.076 0.091 0.053** 0.027 0.038
(0.100) (0.097) (0.107) (0.019) (0.031) (0.032)
Micro Firm -0.798*** -0.814*** -1.354*** 0.163 0.144 -0.064
(0.190) (0.204) (0.348) (0.086) (0.117) (0.171)
Small Firm -0.437* -0.422* -0.777** 0.076* 0.077* 0.039
(0.203) (0.207) (0.219) (0.033) (0.037) (0.053)
1/ Bank Assets (i.e. "Smaller Banks") 0.004 0.001*
(0.003) (0.001)
Smaller Bank x Micro 0.006 0.005 0.076 0.001 -0.001 0.025
(0.004) (0.003) (0.067) (0.002) (0.002) (0.025)
Smaller Bank x Small 0.006 0.005 0.055 0.001 -0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.046) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 83,930 83,930 83,930 83,930 83,930 83,930
R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.21
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by bank
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Lending terms by Bank Size and the Strength of the Competitive Environment                                     
(Using 1/ BANK ASSETS to proxy for bank size)
Appendix 3
OLS OLS
Log Amount Log Rate